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THE LEMON TEST: SHOULD IT BE RETAINED,
REFORMULATED OR REJECTED?
CARL H. ESBECK*
The establishment clause severs the link between church
and state, but it does not disassociate religion from govern-
ment. Therein lies the seed of a problem, for in practice it has
proven difficult to accomplish the desired separation of church
and state without adversely affecting the manner in which reli-
gion is permitted to shape democratic government. Because
the state has no competence in religious matters, government
is prohibited from sanctioning any particular religion by codify-
ing its confession of faith into civil law. On the other hand,
when strict separationists, asserting the establishment clause,
seek to protect the acts of state from "contamination" by reli-
gion, it discourages citizens from using their religious faith as
the basis for political action and speech. At the level of individ-
uals, this drives a wedge between the religionist's life as a citi-
zen and his identity as a believer. On the level of political
community, this leads to moral indirection and thus a less sta-
ble society.'
* Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia.
1. See Mittleman, Toward a Postseparationist Public Philosophy: A Jewish
Contribution, 24 THIs WORLD 87, 98-99 (1989):
As a defensive strategy, [strict] separationism neglects the task of
recovering a free and democratic public life, sustained by the
practical reasoning, public virtue, and dedication to the common
good of the moral and spiritual communities. Although it guards
the public square against domination by one or another set of
symbols, it leaves the public square without symbol, bereft of moral
principle and order other than that provided by the inherent
structures of bureaucracy and technological pursuit.
It forbids precisely those sources of meaning and value which
inform the lives of moral and spiritual communities from entering
into the realm which most requires guidance and direction. It lays
both religion and the religious communities onto a Procrustean bed,
for it construes religion as a kind of moralistic, privatistic intruder.
Rather than grasp religion as a source of communal action, freedom
and vision, it imagines religion as a bald set of do's and don'ts, alien
in kind to a pluralistic public life. Religion's ability to shape a broad
program of service is overlooked. Furthermore, the religious
communities themselves are reduced to social problems vis-A-vis the
general order. Whenever they seek to involve themselves in the
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There is near-universal agreement that the establishment
clause, working alongside the free exercise clause, has as its
ultimate goal the protection of religious liberty. Moreover,
most readily agree that this religious liberty obtains for the
non-religious as well as the religious.2 But when those profess-
ing no religion (and those holding their religion of only private
consequence) maintain that the establishment clause assures
them a government free from the influence of religion, the
clash becomes manifest. The courts are seemingly presented
with an irreconcilable choice between the duty of government
to refrain from passing laws "respecting an establishment of
religion" and the duty of government to refrain from inhibiting
the free speech and political participation rights of those citi-
zens promoting religious values as a basis for lawmaking.'
An apparent resolution is offered by conceding full first
amendment rights of speech and political participation to those
religious adherents who persist in inserting their beliefs into
public debate. However, should these same citizens success-
fully sponsor a law coinciding with their religious values, then,
it is argued, the church-state separation embodied in the estab-
lishment clause is violated. This makes little sense. Were that
the legal effect of the first amendment, religious citizens would
either be isolated from civic life or compelled to be barren in
their political efforts. It is an argument that all religion is sepa-
shaping of public policy, they are reduced to interest groups or
dismissed for their lack of expertise.
2. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961).
3. It is too often forgotten that the Bill of Rights restrains only acts of
government, not the actions of private citizens and organizations. Thus, for
example, in the course of a debate over public policy, the free speech clause
cannot be violated by a citizen's (or church's) speech having religious
content. They are simply not "state actors." The Bill of Rights imposes
duties only on government, including individuals acting within the scope of
their official duties. Careless statements to the contrary are not uncommon.
For example, work through the "vice versa" implications of this statement:
"Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly,
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice
versa." Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947). Or, consider what
the following statement would mean for the church's tradition of social and
political activism: "Under our system, the choice has been made that
government is to be entirely excluded from the area of religious instruction
and churches excluded from the affairs of government." Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971).
It is understood, of course, that the establishment clause has application
when religious citizens or organizations have co-opted the government and
are using the instrumentalities of the state as a platform for advancing
religion. In such an event, however, it is government (not the religious
citizen or organization) that has breached its first amendment duty.
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rated from public relevance. While these voters can participate
fully in the political process as a matter of free speech, they can
never win a debate because the legislation they promote out of
reasons of faith transgresses the establishment clause.
This essay addresses the Supreme Court's three-part
establishment clause test originally set down in Lemon v. Kurtz-
man.4 Part I concerns the manner in which the Lemon test has
substantially evolved. Part II explores what the evolved test
has to offer by way of solving the seemingly conflicting duties
not to inhibit free speech and political rights, while at the same
time refraining from passing laws "respecting an establishment
of religion." Finally, Part III addresses some of the proposals
to supplant Lemon altogether.
I.
Although clinging to the shell of its doctrine, the three-
part Lemon test has been materially altered by the Supreme
Court since its promulgation in 1971. Because the lower fed-
eral courts and many commentators still begin their analysis of
establishment clause cases with rote recitation of Chief Justice
Burger's outline in Lemon v. Kurtzman of the purpose, effect,
and entanglement formulation of the test, 5 apparently the shift
in how these three elements are applied is not fully recognized.
Accordingly, what follows is a brief review of the important
alterations in how the Court applies the Lemon doctrine.
A. The "Purpose" Prong
To survive establishment clause analysis, a statute must
have, according to the first of the three requirements laid down
in Lemon, a "secular legislative purpose." This original test has
now been, in significant respects, inverted. Currently, the
Supreme Court will invalidate legislation under Lemon's first
prong "only if it is motivated wholly by an impermissible pur-
pose,''6 or only when it can be said that the law's "pre-eminent
4. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
5. Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the
cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years. Three
such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must
have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally,
the statute must not foster "an excessive government entanglement
with religion."
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
6. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2570 (1988); see Lynch v.
1990]
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purpose .. . is plainly religious in nature. ' 7 Conversely, the
Court has said that "a statute that is motivated in part by a reli-
gious purpose" does not violate the purpose prong, 8 nor is it
required that a "law's purpose must be unrelated to religion,"
for that would require government to "show a callous indiffer-
ence to religious groups." 9 As reformulated, then, the proper
inquiry is whether the sole purpose of the law is to advance
religion. When government acts either out of reasons that are
arguably secular, or with mixed secular and religious purposes,
the first prong of Lemon is not violated.' °
The reasons why the Court softened the rigor of the pur-
pose element in Lemon seem to be four-fold: (1) the difficulty in
reliably determining the subjective motivation behind an enact-
ment that is the product of a complex legislative process; (2)
the impropriety of the judicial branch deeply probing the inner
workings of the legislative branch; (3) the disutility of invalidat-
ing a good law that would be constitutional but for an imper-
missible legislative motive; and (4) the futility of invalidating a
law that would be constitutional but for an impermissible legis-
lative motive, when the law is likely to be re-enacted "cleansed"
of improper motive. Indeed, for these collective reasons, and
others, two members of the current Supreme Court would
abandon the purpose prong altogether."
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984) ("motivated wholly by religious
considerations").
7. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (per curiam); see also
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 590 (1987) ("preeminent religious
purpose"); id. 605 ("interference with the decisions of these authorities
[school boards] is warranted only when the purpose for their decisions is
clearly religious") (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
8. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985).
9. Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987)
(citation omitted).
10. See Carter v. Broadlawns Medical Center, 857 F.2d 448, 454 (8th
Cir. 1988) (upholding employment of Church of Christ deacon as chaplain by
county hospital to counsel patients, outpatients and relatives,
notwithstanding mixed secular and religious purpose), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
1569 (1989).
This shift in the purpose prong anticipates criticism in The Williamsburg
Charter 16 (1988):
Words such as public, secular and religious should be free from
discriminatory bias. "Secular purpose," for example, should not
mean "non-religious purpose" but "general public purpose."
Otherwise, the impression is gained that "public is equivalent to
secular; religion is equivalent to private." Such equations are
neither accurate nor just.
11. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
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Because of the difficulty in determining lawmakers' true
motives for enacting a statute or adopting a particular policy,
the Court has avoided making motive-analysis part of legal doc-
trine in areas of constitutional law other than church-state rela-
tions. " With the establishment clause, while not abandoning
motive-analysis altogether, 3 the Court has adopted a highly
deferential inquiry. When a plausible non-religious purpose
appears on the face of the challenged statute or regulation,"
the Court is inclined summarily to announce the element satis-
fied and move quickly on to the second and third prongs of
Lemon. 5
A sensitivity to courts remaining within the defined author-
ity of the judicial branch was stated very pointedly by Justice
O'Connor in Wallace v. Jaffree, " where she said the inquiry into
impermissible purpose must be "deferential and limited,"
dissenting); Wallace v. Jaifree, 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
12. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971) ("[I]t is
extremely difficult for a court to ascertain the motivation, or collection of
different motivations, that lie behind a legislative enactment."); United States
v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) ("Inquiries into Congressional motives
or purpose are a hazardous matter").
13. Compare McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 466, 468-69 (1961)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment) with McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S.
618, 636 n.9 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
14. Justice Scalia helpfully distinguished "purpose" from "motive" as
follows:
For while it is possible to discern the objective "purpose" of a
statute (i.e., the public good at which its provisions appear to be
directed), or even the formal motivation for a statute where it is
explicitly set forth ... , discerning the subjective motivation of those
enacting the statute is, to be honest, an impossible task.
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
15. The Supreme Court has in most cases easily found a permissible
purpose for a law in the statute's language, its legislative history, or simply by
exercising common sense. This approach was acceded to by the dissenting
justices in Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2587 (1988), where Justice
Blackmun stated: "As is often the case, it is the effect of the statute, rather
than its purpose, that creates Establishment Clause problems .... I have no
meaningful disagreement with the majority's discussion of the AFLA's
essentially secular purpose."
16. 472 U.S. 38, 67 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also Mueller
v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983) (upholding Minnesota tuition tax
deduction for parents of school-aged children, including parochial students),
where, concerning the deferential application of the purpose prong in Lemon,
the Supreme Court said: "This reflects, at least in part, our reluctance to
attribute unconstitutional motives to the States, particularly when a plausible
secular purpose for the State's program may be discerned from the face of
the statute."
19901
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because "a court has no license to psychoanalyze the legisla-
tors."17 It would be unseemly for courts to engage in the busi-
ness of conducting a virtual Testimonial Inquisition-
summoning to the witness stand and probing in open court the
religious tenets, values, and subjective motivations of the rele-
vant lawmakers. As Justice Brennan succinctly stated the mat-
ter in McDaniel v. Paty:' 8
Government may not inquire into the religious beliefs
and motivations of officeholders-it may not remove
them from office for merely making public statements
regarding religion, or question whether their legislative
actions stem from religious conviction.
Indeed, there is a line of Supreme Court cases holding that
judges are to avoid inquiries into legislative motivation, and
especially to avoid placing lawmakers on the witness stand to
be interrogated as to their motivations back at the time a stat-
ute or regulation was debated and adopted.1 9 Moreover, there
is an additional line of Supreme Court cases requiring avoid-
ance of inquiries into the significance of religious beliefs and
practices of individuals and their denomination, including, pre-
sumably, those of the relevant lawmakers.20
This highly deferential approach can be seen at work in the
Supreme Court's parochial aid cases. Obviously, state pro-
grams to aid parochial schools would never be enacted were it
not for the concerted efforts of religious leaders, their lobby-
ists, and parochial school parents brought to bear on elected
17. 472 U.S. at 74. See also Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 466 (1961) ("To ask what interest, what
objective, legislation serves, of course, is not to psychoanalyze its legislators,
but to examine the necessary effects of what they have enacted.").
18. 435 U.S. 618, 641 (1978) (Brennan,J., concurring in the judgment)
(citation omitted).
19. See, e.g., County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 176 n.16
(1981); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev., 429 U.S.
252, 268 n.18 (1977); United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941); cf.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 469 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring
in the judgment). See also Discount Records v. City of North Little Rock, 671
F.2d 1220, 1222 (8th Cir. 1982).
20. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) ("Courts
are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation."); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440
U.S. 490 (1979) (inappropriate to have NLRB second guessing whether
religious reasons given by religious authorities are sincere); Serbian Eastern
Orthodox v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (no judicial review of dispute
concerning meaning of church rules and doctrine); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 669 (1970) (avoid entanglement with church authorities); United
States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (courts cannot challenge the truth or
falsity of a religious claim, only assess its sincerity).
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representatives. Nevertheless, the Court repeatedly finds such
legislation surviving the purpose prong of Lemon. 2 ' Of course,
that is not to say that state aid to parochial schools is consistent
with the establishment clause, and indeed the Court to date has
invalidated most forms of aid to independent religious
schools. 2 The point here is that these cases were decided
under the effect and entanglement prongs, not the purpose
prong.
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Wallace v. Jaf-
free23 is the most detailed discussion by any member of the
Court concerning the limit to which courts should defer to a
legislature's profession of a nonreligious purpose. InJaffree, a
majority of justices said that they would sustain the constitu-
tionality of a moment-of-silence to begin each public school
day.2 4  However, in defiance of Engel v. Vitale,25 Alabama
21. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977); Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 363 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613
(1971).
22. At both the primary and secondary school levels, as a general rule
the Supreme Court has invalidated public aid to religious schools in the form
of direct monetary transfers and aid in the form of equipment, services, or
reimbursement for same where the equipment or services could possibly be
diverted to a sectarian use. Thus, the Court struck down government aid in
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (public school teachers providing
remedial education and attendant materials at religious school campus);
Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (public instructional
equipment); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (counseling and special
education services provided at religious school campus; loan of instructional
equipment); Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756 (1973) (grants for building maintenance; tuition grants to parents;
tuition tax credits); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973) (tuition
reimbursement); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty,
413 U.S. 472 (1973) (reimbursement for cost of teacher-prepared testing and
record keeping required by law); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)
(teacher salary supplement; cash reimbursement for textbooks).
The Supreme Court has upheld state aid to primary and secondary
religious schools in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (tuition tax
deductions); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980)
(subsidy for state-prepared testing and record keeping required by law);
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (textbooks; standardized tests and
scoring services; diagnostic services on campus with therapeutic services to
follow off-campus if indicated); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (loan
of textbooks); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (textbooks);
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (school bus transportation).
23. 472 U.S. 38, 67 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
24. Chief Justice Burger and Justices O'Connor, Powell, White, and
Rehnquist indicated that they would uphold a moment-of-silence law
untainted by an impermissible purpose. Id. at 62 (Powell, J., concurring); id.
at 67 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 85 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 90
(White, J., dissenting); id at 91 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1990]
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lawmakers readily conceded that their purpose was to re-intro-
duce prayer in the public schools.2 6 Consequently, the pur-
pose was pre-eminently religious, and thus violative of the
establishment clause. Justice O'Connor formulated the defer-
ential purpose inquiry as follows:
Since there is arguably a secular pedagogical value to a
moment of silence in public schools, courts should find
an improper purpose behind such a statute only if the
statute on its face, in its official legislative history, or in its
interpretation by a responsible administrative agency
suggests it has the primary purpose of endorsing
prayer. 27
Thus, application of the purpose prong will only rarely
result in invalidation of statutes or administrative regulations.
Nonetheless, the deferential purpose inquiry does make an
important contribution to religious liberty. A lawmaking body
cannot overtly manifest a religious purpose, thus alienating
religious minorities or others from their government. Should
lawmakers evince a nonreligious purpose on the face of a law,
and in its legislative history, and should such prefatory lan-
guage not be a transparent sham, the purpose element is satis-
fied. By limiting its purpose inquiry to facial analysis, the
official legislative record, and settled administrative interpreta-
tionJustice O'Connor's deferential approach may spawn disin-
genuous actions by lawmakers to hide their true motives by
"sanitizing" the official record. But even this consequence
serves the laudatory purpose of forcing government to give the
appearance of having only permissible motives. And of course,
the effect and entanglement prongs of the Lemon test could still
serve to invalidate the legislation.
Establishment clause challenges over statutes, regulations,
written policies, and the like-all products of deliberative law-
making bodies-should be distinguished from lawsuits con-
cerning the discretionary acts of government employees. The
distinction is illustrated by the recent case of Roberts v. Madi-
gan.28 Kenneth Roberts, a fifth grade public school teacher,
was found to have a religious purpose in placing two Christian
books (The Bible in Pictures and The Life of Jesus) in his in-class-
room library, in silently reading a Bible at his desk in view of
25. 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (striking down public school prayer).
26. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 43; id. at 67 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 75.
28. 702 F. Supp. 1505 (D. Colo. 1989) (denying preliminary injunctive
relief to classroom teacher).
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the students during free-reading curricular hours, and in plac-
ing a religious poster in his classroom.29 If it is correct, as the
court found, that the teacher's motive was to bootleg evangeli-
cal Christianity into the classroom, this seems an entirely cor-
rect-but distinguishable-application of the purpose prong.
None of the problems noted earlier-difficulty, propriety, disu-
tility, or futility-attend a vigorous application of Lemon's pur-
pose prong when the lawsuit challenges discretionary acts of
government employees.
B. The "Effect" Prong
Lemon's second prong required that the "principal or pri-
mary effect" of a law or governmental policy "must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion." Conversely, the
Supreme Court has sustained the constitutionality of laws that
have only an incidental or de minimis effect of advancing reli-
gion." When religion is materially advanced by a law, albeit
29. Id. at 1515. The court also found that the school's removal of the
Bible from the main school library was improper, and ordered officials to
replace it. Id. at 1512-13.
30. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988) (federal law
promoting teenage chastity and discouraging abortion and premarital sex;
funding counselors, including those with religious affiliation, and permitting
grantees to involve religious organizations in promoting traditional family
values); Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987)
(federal civil rights act concerning non-discrimination in employment
exempting from its sweep religious employers as to both religious and
secular jobs); Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S.
481 (1986) (state vocational rehabilitation funding for blind person to attend
Bible school for training in career as pastor, missionary or youth director);
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 683 (1984) (municipal Christmas display,
including scene depicting nativity of Christ, is "no more an advancement or
endorsement of religion than the Congressional and Executive recognition of
the origins of the holiday itself as Christ's Mass, or the exhibition of literally
hundreds of religious paintings in governmentally supported museums.");
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (government-paid Presbyterian
minister employed for 16 years as state legislative chaplain); Mueller v. Allen,
463 U.S. 388 (1983) (Minnesota income tax deduction for tuition and
expenses paid by parochial school parents); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263
(1981) (freedom of speech and assembly rights require state university to
afford equal access to student religious groups, and such utilization of
government facilities has no religious effect other than "incidental"); Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (federal Hyde Amendment banning funding
of abortions); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (state bonds to construct
church-related college facilities); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971)
(direct federal aid to church-related colleges and universities in the form of
grants for constructing buildings); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)
(property tax exemptions for churches and other religious organizations);
Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (state provision of secular
1990]
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unintentionally, presumably the effect or impact would be
apparent from the day-to-day operation of the law. That is, in a
straightforward application of an effect test there would have to
be measurable, palpable evidence that a religion (or religion
generally) is advanced. In its application of the test, however,
the Court has not always proceeded so forthrightly.
In certain cases the Court has been willing to infer or
assume that the impact of challenged legislation would be to
advance religion materially. This, of course, gives the effect
prong a pre-emptive strike capability. If no actual advance-
ment of religion has to be shown, the mere presence of such a
hazard being sufficient, 1 it is not a true impact test. Further,
this state of affairs was not unrelated to the Court's adding as a
third prong to Lemon the entanglement test. The effect and
entanglement elements worked together to ensure that nearly
all state aid to parochial schools violated the establishment
clause. If the legislation did not carefully police the parochial
school to ensure that government funds were not used to
advance religion, it was assumed the law would have that effect.
On the other hand, if adequate administrative controls were in
place to ensure that government monies were used only for
permissible purposes, the legislation excessively entangled reli-
gious school authorities with state auditing regulations and
personnel. Parochial school legislation could be struck down
even before the law's effective date, rather than having to wait
several months for evidence to mount that the funding was hav-
ing a measurable impact on the advancement of religion. In
tandem, the effect and entanglement prongs worked as an
abortifacient ensuring that few state-conceived programs sur-
vived litigation.
An important limiting feature of this pre-emptive strike
effect prong was that the Catch-22 applied only when the bene-
fited institutions were "pervasively sectarian."' 2 The definition
of a "pervasively sectarian" institution was stated in general
textbooks for use in parochial schools); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163
(1965) (Selective Service System exemption for religious objectors to military
service); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday "blue law"
legislation); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (release-time program so
children may obtain religious training off public school campus); Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (reimbursement to parents of parochial
school children for expense of bus transportation).
31. See Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385, 387
(1985); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 254 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349, 370, 372 (1975); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472,
480 (1973); cf Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2575 (1988).
32. Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 760-761
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terms,33 but only church-affiliated primary and secondary
schools have ever been found by the Supreme Court to fit the
profile. (Presumably, a church, synagogue, or mosque would
also be regarded as "pervasively sectarian.") So long as chal-
lenged legislation did not involve a "pervasively sectarian"
institution, the effect prong of Lemon had no pre-emptive capa-
(1976) (plurality opinion); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 682 (1971); f.
Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2576 (1988).
33. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 758 (1976)
(plurality opinion). In Roemer, the Supreme Court turned back a challenge to
the constitutionality of a state funding program that afforded noncategorical
grants to eligible colleges and universities, including sectarian institutions
that awarded more than just seminarian or theological degrees. In discussion
focused on the fostering of religion, the Supreme Court said:
[T]he primary-effect question is the substantive one of what private
educational activities, by whatever procedure, may be supported by
state funds. Hunt [v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973)] requires (1) that
no state aid at all go to institutions that are so "pervasively
sectarian" that secular activities cannot be separated from sectarian
ones, and (2) that if secular activities can be separated out, they
alone may be funded.
Roemer, 426 U.S. at 755 (emphasis in original).
The Baptist college in Hunt and the Roman Catholic colleges in Roemer
were held not to be "pervasively sectarian." The record in Roemer supported
findings that the institutions employed chaplains who held worship services
on campus, taught mandatory religious classes, and started some classes with
prayer. However, there was a high degree of autonomy from the Roman
Catholic Church, the faculty was not hired on a religious basis and had com-
plete academic freedom except in religious classes, and students were chosen
without regard to their religion. The challenged state aid in Hunt was for the
construction of secular college facilities. The legislation granted the author-
ity to issue revenue bonds. The Court upheld the legislation, commenting on
the primary-effect test:
Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing
religion when it flows to an institution in which religion is so perva-
sive that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the
religious mission or when it funds a specifically religious activity in
an otherwise secular setting.
Hunt, 413 U.S. at 743
A comparison of the colleges in Roemer and Hunt with the elementary and
secondary schools in Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
767-768 (1973), will help to clarify the term "pervasively religious." The
parochial schools in Nyquist, found to be pervasively religious, conformed to
the following profile: the schools placed religious restrictions on student
admissions and faculty appointments, they enforced obedience to religious
dogma, they required attendance at religious services, they required religious
or doctrinal study, the schools were an integral part of the religious mission
of the sponsoring church, they had religious indoctrination as a primary pur-
pose, and they imposed religious restrictions on how and what the faculty
could teach. The state aid in ,Vyquist was held to be prohibited by the estab-
lishment clause.
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bility, and thus the Court still required measurable, palpable
evidence that religion was materially advanced.
To see this in operation, consider the Supreme Court's
statement in Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 34 upholding
an exemption in a civil rights law for religious employers where
the discrimination is on the basis of religion. The Court
refused to find the exemption violated the effect prong because
there was "no persuasive evidence in the record . . .that the
Church's ability to propagate its religious doctrine through the
Gymnasium [operated by the Church] is any greater now than
it was prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.""s
Likewise, in Widmar v. Vincent, 6 the Court held that it would
not be violative of the establishment clause to give student reli-
gious organizations equal access to meeting facilities at a state
university campus. The Court insisted that evidence was
required before it would find a religious impact: "[Iln the
absence of empirical evidence that religious groups will domi-
nate [the university's] open forum, we agree with the Court of
Appeals that the advancement of religion would not be the
forum's 'primary effect.' "7
The possibilities for exploiting the foregoing distinction
became more evident following Bowen v. Kendrick, the most
important establishment clause case from the Court's 1987-88
Term. One of the many interesting aspects of Kendrick is that
the majority was unwilling to find that church-affiliated teenage
counseling centers were "pervasively sectarian.''38 Thus, the
Court turned back the facial challenge to the legislation insofar
as the claim was based on the assumption that the counseling
of adolescents by religious agencies concerning teen sexuality,
pregnancy, and abortion could not be conducted in a nonreli-
gious context. After Kendrick, it is quite possible that the Court
will find no categorically "pervasively sectarian" organizations
other than parochial schools. 9 If this happens, then establish-
34. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
35. Id. 337.
36. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
37. Id. at 275. But cf. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), upholding
state income tax deduction for tuition and other expenses incurred by
parents of school children. Over 90% of the tax benefits were realized by
parents enrolling their children in parochial schools. Accordingly, Mueller has
to be explained by the "facial-neutrality, private-choice" variation. See infra
notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
38. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2574-76, 2578, 2580 (1988).
39. Indeed, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, indicated that he
would drain the category "pervasively sectarian" of nearly all meaning. Id. at
2582 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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ment clause challenges to funding legislation (other than fund-
ing for parochial schools) will have to be challenged on an "as
applied" basis. This, of course, puts a considerable burden on
church-state separationists-at least insofar as they rely upon
the effect prong of Lemon-for their agenda can be advanced in
the courts only on a piecemeal, case-by-case basis. Henceforth,
a violation of the effect prong must be buttressed by substantial
evidence that religion is being advanced-the only exception
being the "pervasively sectarian" church-affiliated schools.
Another interesting shift occurring under the effect prong
of Lemon is the emergence of a "facial-neutrality, private-
choice" variation. The Court has been unwilling to find imper-
missible effects where the challenged legislation merely
empowers students, parents, or taxpayers to advance their
independently chosen religious objectives. Mueller v. Allen 4" is
especially instructive on this variant of the effect test. A 5 to 4
majority in Mueller upheld a Minnesota income tax deduction
for tuition and other expenses incurred by parents of primary
and secondary students, including parochial school students.
Challengers to the Minnesota tax law had ample documenta-
tion in the record that the vast majority of the beneficiaries of
the tax deduction were parochial school parents.4" Nonethe-
less, Justice Rehnquist (now Chief Justice) brushed aside this
evidence of religious impact.
It is true, of course, that financial assistance provided to
parents ultimately has an economic effect comparable to
that of aid given directly to the schools attended by their
children. It is also true, however, that under Minnesota's
arrangement public funds become available only as a
result of numerous private choices of individual parents
of school-age children .... Where, as here, aid to paro-
chial schools is available only as a result of decisions of
individual parents no "imprimatur of State approval" can
be deemed to have been conferred on any particular reli-
gion, or on religion generally.4 2
The same "facial-neutrality, private-choice" variant of the
effect test is embodied in Witters v. Washington Department of Serv-
ices for the Blind,4 3 where the Court upheld a state vocational
40. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
41. Id. at 408-11 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (over 90% of tuition-
charging schools were religious and approximately 96% of taxpayers eligible
for deduction enrolled children in religious schools).
42. Id. at 399 (citation omitted).
43. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
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rehabilitation program as applied to a blind student who chose
to apply his benefits to attending a Bible school in pursuit of a
career as a pastor, missionary, or church youth director.
Widmar v. Vincent 4 4 is also supportive of this "facial-neu-
trality, private-choice" variant. In Widmar, the Court held that
merely because some university students, prompted by their
own interests and motivations, might utilize state property to
advance religious interests, it did not follow that the university
as custodian of the property was violating the establishment
clause.45
The "facial-neutrality, private-choice" variant on Lemon's
effect analysis presumably would sustain two widely used fed-
eral income tax benefits. Federal income tax deductions are
provided to those making charitable contributions, including
donations to religious organizations. 46 A tax credit is available
for child-care expenses of two-paycheck families, including
families who select a church-operated preschool to provide
early-childhood education. 47 This variant would also permit
voucher plans for preschool funding, as well as primary and
secondary education.
It would appear that the "facial-neutrality, private-choice"
variant is the Supreme Court's adjustment to modernity.
Before the enormous growth in government-operated social
programs, the Court could, in a practical sense, have insisted
on strict separationism-the state having little to do with reli-
gious organizations beyond provision of police and fire protec-
tion. With the arrival of the modern welfare and regulatory
state, to exclude only religious organizations from participation
in the delivery of the benefits of social programs appears dis-
44. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
45. Id. at 271-72 n.10, 274 n.14. The result-although not the
rationale-in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), is supportive of
the "facial-neutrality, private-choice" reading of the effect test. Everson
upheld the constitutionality of governmental reimbursement of municipal
bus fare paid by the parents of school-age children. The benefit was available
to parents of both public and parochial school children. See also Board of
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (upholding the loaning of secular
textbooks to students in grades seven through twelve, including students in
sectarian and nonsectarian private schools). But see Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306 (1952), where the Court upheld a program for off-campus release
time from public school to attend religious education classes. Participation
was voluntary and required written parental permission. However, the
program was not facially neutral, as release time was available only to attend
religious classes.
46. I.R.C. § 170 (West Supp. 1989).
47. I.R.C. § 21 (West Supp. 1989).
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criminatory, and, for some, evidences official hostility toward
religion. But directly funding religious organizations can have
the effect of advancing religion and inevitably fosters adminis-
trative entanglements. The "facial-neutrality, private-choice"
variation has the effect of indirectly benefiting religion. How-
ever, it does so only through numerous individual, voluntary
decisions by students, parents, and taxpayers to "spend" their
social welfare entitlements at the religious program that has
gained their loyalty. Moreover, institutional involvement
between church and state is minimal or nonexistent. Strict sep-
arationist theory, therefore, is jettisoned under this variant, and
replaced by an institutional separation of church and state.
Growth in government social programs has been followed
by an emerging regulatory state. This regulation has forced a
decision over application of the effect prong of Lemon to reli-
gious exemptions from generally applicable regulatory legisla-
tion. If a religious exemption is provided to avoid
administrative entanglement between church and state, reli-
gious organizations are relieved from regulatory duties
imposed on all others-even when the exemption is not
required by the free exercise clause. Nevertheless, the Court
has found that these exemptions do not violate the establish-
ment clause. While entanglement-avoidance exemptions
started with Walz v. Tax Commission,48 the recent case of Corpora-
tion of Presiding Bishop v. Amos 4 9 secured its position in effect
prong analysis. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended in 1972, exempted religious organizations from the
requirement that employers not discriminate on the basis of
religion. Finding that the effect prong was not violated, the
Court in Amos said:
[R]eligious groups have been better able to advance their
purposes on account of many laws that had passed consti-
tutional muster .... A law is not unconstitutional simply
because it allows churches to advance religion, which is
their very purpose.50
The same analysis underlies NLRB v. Catholic Bishop.5
While clearly raising the establishment clauses issue-for the
broad language in the National Labor Relations Act included
religious schools within its scope-the Court in Catholic Bishop
dodged the constitutional issue by fashioning a new rule of
48. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
49. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
50. Id. at 336-37.
51. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
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statutory construction. Pointing to the high stakes of an
explicit first amendment ruling, the Court held that it would
not assume that Congress intended to regulate parochial
schools unless it specifically stated the intent to include them in
the Act. Catholic Bishop suggests that the prospect of National
Labor Relations Board jurisdiction over lay parochial school
teachers poses "difficult and sensitive questions" and "a signifi-
cant risk"5 2 that regulation can have the primary effect of inhib-
iting religion, contrary to the second prong of Lemon. Statutory
exemptions to avoid such regulation, accordingly, do not have
the impermissible effect of advancing religion.
C. The "Entanglement" Prong
Initially, the third prong of Lemon required an examination
concerning whether the law in question fostered5" (1) excessive
administrative entanglement between church and state, or (2)
political divisiveness along religious lines. The Court's scru-
tiny of entanglement between religious groups and agencies of
government appears to retain its bite.5 4 However, the political
divisiveness element is now repudiated by a majority of the
Court. This occurred in two ways. First, it was said that polit-
ical divisiveness analysis is to be applied only in parochial
school cases.5 5 Second, and more tellingly, it was said that evi-
dence of political divisiveness cannot alone serve to invalidate
otherwise lawful conduct.56 Unless, therefore, there is a show-
ing of excessive administrative entanglement, or unless the
purpose or effect prongs of Lemon are violated, an allegation of
political divisiveness along religious lines does not state a claim
52. Id. at 502, 507.
53. In Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2570 (1988), ChiefJustice
Rehnquist stated that, under Lemon, "a court may invalidate a statute if it
requires excessive entanglement between church and state." (emphasis added).
It is not clear whether this change, which narrows the third prong of Lemon,
was intentional.
54. See infra text accompanying notes 62-71.
55. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2578 n.14 (1988); Corporation
of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 n.17 (1987) (citing Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 404 n.l I (1983)).
56. Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 n. 17
(1987); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 684 (1984); Mueller v. Allen 463
U.S. 388, 403-04 n. 11 (1983). This is a repudiation of Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 622-23 (1971); see also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 256
(1977) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 258-59 (Marshall, J.,
concurring and dissenting); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 374-77 (1975)
(Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
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for which relief can be granted. Thus, political divisiveness is
no longer an element in its own right of the Lemon test.
Before its recent repudiation, political divisiveness analysis
was heavily criticized 5 7 because it ran counter to the Court's
recognition in Walz v. Tax Commission 58 that censorship on the
basis of religious content severely infringes free speech and
political participation rights protected by the first
amendment.5 9
Some clarity regarding political divisiveness inquiry
emerged in Lynch v. Donnelly, when Chief Justice Burger noted
that "[a] litigant cannot, by the very act of commencing a law-
suit ... create the appearance of divisiveness and then exploit it
as evidence of entanglement, 6 0 and Justice O'Connor added
that "the constitutional inquiry should focus ultimately on the
character of the government activity that might cause such divi-
siveness, not on the divisiveness itself."'" Even admitting into
evidence acts of political divisiveness in establishment clause
litigation will work to chill the speech and political activity of
religionists. If we take freedom of speech seriously, we should
not mourn the passing of political divisiveness as a separate
element of the Lemon test.
Concerning excessive administrative entanglement (better
termed "institutional encroachment"), the Supreme Court's
entanglement-avoidance analysis is most easily seen in paro-
chial aid decisions. While the result in many of these cases is
the invalidation of state funding plans that directly aid paro-
57. See Gaffney, Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The
Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 205 (1980).
58. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
59. Adherents of particular faiths and individual churches
frequently take strong positions on public issues including . . .
vigorous advocacy of legal or constitutional positions. Of course,
churches as much as secular bodies and private citizens have that
right.
Id. at 670. As suggested by Walz, the religious community cannot be
excluded from the common discourse where organized religion along with
others articulate their values, visions, and hopes. The premise that religion
should be excluded because it is controversial or because opinions about reli-
gion are not held mildly is anomalous. When broadly applied, the test
amounts to censorship by precluding public debate on certain subjects by the
religious community. Reconciling the political divisiveness standard, which
the Court has persisted in repeating in the past (see, e.g., Larson v. Valente,
102 S. Ct. 1673, 1688 (1982)), with the desired robust freedom of speech for
all, including religious groups, does not seem possible.
60. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984).
61. Id. at 689 (O'Connor, J, concurring).
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chial schools, the language of the Court often states a rationale
of protecting the religious schools, not preventing their advance-
ment. For example, in Lemon, the Court emphasized that the
religious clauses' "objective is to prevent . . .the intrusion of
either [state or religion] into the precincts of the other."6 2
The 1986 Aguilar v. Felton6' decision is the Court's most
recent decision on entanglement in independent religious
schools. Aguilar struck down a federal education program that
paid the salaries of public school employees who taught low-
income, educationally deprived children enrolled in public or
private schools. In order to insure that public funds not aid
religion, the educational law mandated a system of monitoring
in the parochial schools. While serving to avoid aiding reli-
gion, however, the monitoring created an unconstitutional per-
manent and pervasive state presence in the sectarian schools
receiving the aid. The prohibition on excessive entanglement
was said to be rooted on two concerns: freedom of religious
belief for those not aided by the state, and an equal concern to
safeguard "the freedom of even the adherents of the denomi-
nation [supported by the law from being] limited by the gov-
ernmental intrusion into sacred matters." The Court in Aguilar
thus reiterated that the church-state separation embodied in
the establishment clause is for the mutual benefit of both the
religious schools (who ironically, for their own good, are
denied the aid they seek) and the state's citizens.
Outside the context of aid to parochial schools, Gillette v.
United Stites64 presents a classic example of the entanglement
concept used to avoid the involvement of government in diffi-
cult classifications of religious concerns. The petitioners in Gil-
lette claimed that limiting the statutory exemption from
conscription to those who objected to all wars violated the
establishment clause because the exemption discriminated
against religious faiths that permitted fighting only in "just
wars." The Court rejected the argument, noting that the "peti-
tioners ask for greater 'entanglement' by judicial expansion of
the exemption to cover objectors to particular wars."' 65 The
Court reasoned that "the more discriminating and complicated
the basis of classification for an exemption ... the greater the
potential for state involvement" in determining the character
of persons' beliefs and affiliations, thus "entangl[ilng] govern-
62. 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) (emphasis added).
63. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
64. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
65. Id. at 450.
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ment in difficult classifications of what is or is not religious," or
what is and is not conscientious belief.66
The recurring themes of avoiding government involve-
ment in classifying religious practices and avoiding the moni-
toring of religious ministries were brought together in Widmar
v. Vincent.67 Although permitting use of buildings and other
facilities by student groups, the state university in Widmar
sought to bar use by student groups that had a religious pur-
pose. On the basis of speech and associational freedoms, the
Court upheld the right of student groups with a religious focus
to use university facilities on an equal basis with all other stu-
dent groups.68 The lone dissenter, Justice White, argued that
the establishment clause permitted the university to deny use
of its facilities for "religious worship," although he agreed that
"religious speech" could not be excluded based on the Court's
precedents prohibiting content-based censorship. 69  The
majority rejected this suggested distinction between "worship"
and "religious speech" on entanglement-avoidance grounds.
The Court pointed out that the distinction would (1) compel
the state university "to inquire into the significance of words
and practices to different religious faiths, and in varying cir-
cumstances by the same faith," 7 ° and (2) foster "a continuing
need to monitor group meetings to ensure compliance with the
rule." 7 1
II.
A legal principle that threads its way throughout the pur-
pose and effect prongs of the Lemon test is that the statute or
governmental policy being challenged as violative of the estab-
66. Id. at 457 (citations omitted). "While the danger of erratic
decisionmaking unfortunately exists in any system of conscription that takes
individual differences into account, no doubt the dangers would be enhanced
if a conscientious objection of indeterminate scope were honored in theory."
Id. at 458. See Hernandez v. Commissioner, 109 S. Ct. 2136 (1989)
(sustaining, for reasons of entanglement-avoidance, IRS's refusal to
differentiate between "religious" and "secular" benefit to taxpayer
purchasing a service offered by a church, for purposes of allowing claimed tax
deductible contribution); Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S.
574, 604 n.30 (1983) (entanglement avoided when tax exemption denied to
all schools on facially neutral basis regardless of whether or not racial policies
had a religious motive).
67. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
68. Id. at 277.
69. Id. at 283-86 (White, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 269-70 n.6.
71. Id. at 272 n. ll.
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lishment clause will be given closer scrutiny if it is "inherently
religious,"7 2 "plainly religious in nature, ' 73 or of a "pervading
religious character. ' 74 The Supreme Court has distinguished
between laws that promote "religion" in a conventional sense
of the term,75 from laws that have a basis in general morality,
even when religion contributed to the moral foundation that
gave rise to the law. For ease of reference, this legal principle
will be called the "inherently religious analysis" of the Court.
At the outset, it should be emphasized that the inherently
religious analysis has not supplanted the Lemon test. If a chal-
lenged law or governmental policy is not inherently religious,
in the sense explained, it may still fail the three-prong Lemon
test.76 Likewise, when a governmental policy or law is inher-
ently religious, it is still possible that it can survive Lemon analy-
sis. 77 What does appear to be happening with the Court's
inherently religious analysis, is that the rigor of the purpose
and effect prongs of the Lemon test are materially stiffened or
relaxed, as the case may be, depending on whether the chal-
lenged statute is or is not "inherently religious." This is most
interesting, for the inherently religious analysis is one of the
ways the Court has kept the establishment clause from inhib-
iting free speech,78 and the analysis also enables the Court to
avoid the two-definitions-of-religion problem. 9
72. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2572 (1988).
73. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (per curiam).
74. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 (1963).
75. On this understanding, "religion" is limited, in an epistemological
sense, to belief systems that affirm the existence of God or gods.
76. See, e.g., Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 72-73 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("A state-sponsored moment of silence in the public schools is
different from state-sponsored vocal prayer or Bible reading.... [A] moment
of silence is not inherently religious. Silence, unlike prayer or Bible reading,
need not be associated with a religious exercise .... It is difficult to discern a
serious threat to religious liberty from a room of silent, thoughtful
schoolchildren."),
77. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (a scene depicting
the nativity of Jesus Christ, a matter inherently religious, is nonetheless not
violative of the establishment clause where the scene is only a part of a much
larger holiday display); March v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), (daily
prayers offered before a state legislature, a matter inherently religious, is
nonetheless constitutional because of a similar practice being conducted by
the First Congress).
78. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3 and infra notes 115-17.
79. See infra text accompanying notes 103-14.
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A. The Inherently Religious Analysis
Consider the Supreme Court's recent pronouncement
concerning the establishment clause in Bowen v. Kendrick,8 ° a
decision upholding the Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA)
which authorizes federal grants to public and private organiza-
tions for counseling on premarital adolescent sexual relations,
contraception, and pregnancy. In analyzing the effect of the
AFLA under Lemon's second prong, the Kendrick Court said:
The services to be provided under the AFLA are not reli-
gious in character .... [I]t is clear that the AFLA takes a
particular approach toward dealing with adolescent sexu-
ality and pregnancy-for example, two of its stated pur-
poses are to "promote self-discipline and other prudent
approaches to the problem of adolescent premarital sex-
ual relations . . ." and to "promote adoption as an alter-
native . . ." [B]ut again, that approach is not inherently
religious, although it may coincide with the approach taken
by certain religions.8
The Court further stated:
The facially neutral projects authorized by the AFLA-
including pregnancy testing, adoption counseling and
referral services, prenatal and postnatal care ... are not
themselves "specifically religious activities," and they are not
converted into such activities by the fact that they are car-
ried out by organizations with religious affiliations.8 2
Thus, the Court's examination was less scrutinizing because
the AFLA was not "religious in character," not "inherently reli-
gious," and did not fund "specifically religious activities."
Even the dissenting justices agreed that establishment
clause analysis requires line-drawing between "secular values"
and matters of a "religious nature." Thus in his dissent, Justice
Blackmun said:
Whereas there may be secular values promoted by the
AFLA, including the encouragement of adoption and
premarital chastity and the discouragement of abortion,
it can hardly be doubted that when promoted in theologi-
cal terms by religious figures, those values take on a reli-
gious nature.8 3
80. 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988).
81. Id. at 2572 (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 2576 (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 2590 (emphasis added).
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Justice Blackmun contended that courts must examine the con-
text in which the law actually operates. But the dissenting Jus-
tices agreed with the majority that in isolation the AFLA was
not of a religious nature; in other words, that the AFLA was not
"inherently religious." The Supreme Court was unanimous,
then, that in applying Lemon a distinction must be drawn
between laws based in general morality and laws that are intrin-
sically religious, i.e. conventionally regarded as specifically the-
istic in character.
Likewise, in Stone v. Graham, 84 the Court, in analyzing leg-
islative purpose under the first prong of Lemon, stated:
The pre-eminent purpose of posting the Ten Command-
ments on schoolroom walls is plainly religious in nature.
The Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred text in the
Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative recitation
of a supposed secular purpose can blind us to that fact.
The Commandments do not confine themselves to argua-
bly secular matters, such as honoring one's parents, killing
or murder, adultery, stealing, false witness, and covetous-
ness. See Exodus 20:12-17; Deuteronomy 5:16-21.
Rather, the first part of the Commandments concerns the
religious duties of believers: worshipping the Lord God
alone, avoiding idolatry, not using the Lord's name in
vain, and observing the Sabbath day. See Exodus 20:1-
11; Deuteronomy 5:6-15.85
Again, in Abington School District v. Schempp,8 6 the Court, in
analyzing the purpose of a longstanding public school practice,
stated: "Surely the place of the Bible as an instrument of reli-
gion cannot be gainsaid, and the State's recognition of the per-
vading religious character of the ceremony is evident ...."8'
Numerous other cases, both before the Supreme Court
and in the lower federal courts, evidence a two-tier approach of
giving less rigorous review to laws that are arguably based in
public moral concerns, and stringent review to laws that are
intrinsically religious."' By way of illustration, assume that an
84. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (invalidating a statute requiring
posting of the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms).
85. Id. at 41-42 (emphasis added).
86. 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (invalidating classroom devotional Bible
reading).
87. Id. at 224 (emphasis added).
88. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 58 (1985) ("wholly religious
character"); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 108 (1968) ("fundamentalist
sectarian conviction"); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424-25 (1962) ("prayer
has always been very religious"); Florey v. Sioux Falls School Dist., 619 F.2d
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urban public high school principal receives a student petition
of 130 names. Citing increased incidence of teen pregnancy,
venereal disease, and AIDS, the petition requests that condom
dispensers be placed in the school's bathrooms. The principal
thinks this is a good idea and complies. However, the place-
ment of the vending machines soon stirs a big controversy
among parents, local religious leaders, Planned Parenthood,
and other interest groups. Once the local press picks up the
story, the school board is besieged with telephone calls and let-
ters on both sides of the issue. Many parents argue that the
presence of the dispensers conveys the message that the school
condones premarital sex. Others, including some local clerics,
object to the use of artificial contraception, a matter contrary to
the clear teaching of their church. Following a long and at
times rancorous public meeting, the school board, in a divided
vote, orders the vending machines removed. The board's writ-
ten resolution, drafted by legal counsel, gives as the only rea-
son for the removal that the incident is disrupting the
educational environment at the high school. But the prevailing
board members said during the meeting that they oppose the
dispensers for a variety of reasons, including many of the same
concerns cited by the parents and clerics. Assume, further, that
a few students and their parents, assembled by a civil liberties
organization, sue the school board alleging that conservative
religion was the real cause of the board's removal of the dis-
pensers, and that their action thus violates the establishment
clause. An injunction is requested directing that the machines
again be placed in the bathrooms.
Can we seriously suppose that the Supreme Court would
view the dispenser debate as risking an establishment of reli-
gion and order the vendors reinstated to the bathroom walls?
Surely the Court would say that the school's policy, being a
matter not inherently religious, was entirely within the school
board's diicretion. Lemon's purpose and effect prongs would
not be given strict application so as to strike down a policy
bearing on student behavior, even though the views of many
policymakers on this moral issue were concededly shaped by
religion. Moreover, the statements and letters by the parents
and local clerics complaining of the condom dispensers would
not be admitted into evidence at the trial to show religious pur-
pose behind the school board's decision. First, to admit such
evidence would chill the speech and political activity of these
1311, 1314-15 (8th Cir. 1980) ("prayer, by its very nature, is undeniably a
religious exercise"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 987 (1981).
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religionists. Second, the focus of Lemon's purpose prong would
be on the school board's objective purpose in removing the
vending machines, not on the motives or purposes of the inter-
ested community.89
B. When Law and Religion Coincide
The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that mere par-
allelism between the beliefs of a particular religion and legisla-
tion does not ipso facto make the legislation religious for
purposes of the establishment clause." Rules of conduct that
are not "inherently religious" include laws against so-called
victimless crimes such as gambling, alcoholism, prostitution,
obscenity, homosexuality, and adultery. As Justice O'Connor
stated in her concurring opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree:9 '
Chaos would ensue if every such statute were invalidated
under the Establishment Clause. For example, the State
could not criminalize murder for fear that it would
thereby promote the Biblical command against killing.
The task for the Court is to sort out those statutes and
government practices whose purpose and effect go
against the grain of religious liberty protected by the
First Amendment.92
Likewise, in Harris v. McRae,°" upholding the Hyde Amend-
ment notwithstanding its vigorous support by the Roman Cath-
olic Church, Justice Stewart for the Court said: "That the
Judaeo-Christian religions oppose stealing does not mean that
a State or the Federal Government may not, consistent with the
Establishment Clause, enact laws prohibiting larceny."9' 4
For strict separationists to equate morally based laws or
policies with practices that are commonly thought of as intrinsi-
cally religious can lead to some absurd results. It is instructive
to use public schools as a way of illustrating this point. Public
89. Corporation of Presiding Bishops v. Amos, 403 U.S. 327, 335
(1987) ("Lemon's 'purpose' requirement aims at preventing the relevant
governmental decisionmaker-in this case, Congress-from abandoning
neutrality and acting with the intent of promoting a particular point of view in
religious matters.")
90. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2571 n.8, 2572-73
(1988); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319-20 (1980); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961); id. at 462 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in
the judgment).
91. 472 U.S. 38, 67 (1985).
92. Id. at 70.
93. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
94. Id. at 319.
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schools commonly have student behavioral rules against swear-
ing, cursing, or using vulgarity; a dress code that prohibits sex-
ually provocative attire; and authorities commonly make a
policy decision not to have a school-based sex counseling and
contraception distribution center. Yet, each of these familiar
rules and decisions are supported by a community morality
derived in large measure from traditional religious teachings.
It is absurd to say that the establishment clause should thereby
strike down these commonplace rules concerning student
morality. 95
Although no Supreme Court cases address public school
policies or practices that implicate morality when challenged as
violative of the establishment clause, the lower courts have con-
fronted this situation. A first line of cases involves public
school policies regarding sex education and contraception dis-
cussion in the curricula, topics that often figure prominently in
religious teaching. In Mercer v. Michigan State Board of Educa-
tion,96 the court held inter alia that a state statute prohibiting
discussion of birth control in public schools does not violate
the establishment clause. Obviously, the teaching ban was the
result of conservative religious pressure; still the law did not
violate church-state separation. Arguing that the establishment
clause also prohibits hostility towards religion, other plaintiffs
have brought suits claiming that sex education curricula are
hostile to religion and thus violate the establishment clause.
These claims have consistently been rejected because sex edu-
cation is treated as a moral, not a spiritual or creedal matter.97
95. Cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding Georgia
sodomy law). As Chief Justice Burger said in his concurring opinion, the
"[c]ondemnation of [homosexual sodomy] is firmly rooted in Judaeo-
Christian moral and ethical standards." Id. at 196. But the law's religious
underpinnings did not thereby make it violative of the establishment clause.
96. 379 F. Supp. 580, 586 (E.D. Mich.) (three-judge panel), aff'd mem.,
419 U.S. 1081 (1974).
97. See, e.g., Cornwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 314 F. Supp. 340, 343 (D.
Md. 1969), aff'd, 424 F.2d 471 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970)
(unlike "such overt religious activities" as prayer and Bible reading, school's
sex education curriculum not violative of establishment clause even though
program "had some religious connection"); Citizens for Parental Rights v.
San Mateo Bd. of Educ., 51 Cal. App. 3d 1, 124 Cal. Rptr. 68, 83-88 (1975);
Hopkins v. Hamden Bd. of Educ., 29 Conn. Supp. 397, 289 A.2d 914 (1971);
Smith v. Ricci, 89 N.J. 514, 446 A.2d 501, 507, appeal dismissed sub nor. Smith
v. Brandt, 459 U.S. 962 (1982) (state school board regulation requiring local
school districts to develop and implement a family-life education program in
the curriculum did not violate the establishment clause). See also Davis v.
Page, 385 F. Supp. 395, 402-05 (D.N.H. 1974), where a student health class
was objected to by members of the Apostolic Lutheran Church because it
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A second line of cases involves public school textbooks
and curricula and allege establishment clause violations
because the moral content either advanced the religion of secu-
lar humanism or was hostile to the religion of fundamentalist
Christianity. The court in Grove v. Mead School District No. 354,98
held that the use of a book entitled The Learning Tree in an Eng-
lish literature course was not a "religious activity" in the sense
pertinent to the establishment clause, and that it neither estab-
lished secular humanism nor was anti-religious. The court
emphasized that the activity at issue in the case was "not a rit-
ual, but students reading,"9 9 and was therefore distinguishable
from inherently religious activities that had been prohibited in
previous cases of the Supreme Court.' 00
A third line of cases in which the courts have refused to
hold that morally based ideas and rules establish a religion,
concern statutes providing for dismissal or suspension of
teachers for engaging in public sexual conduct. Thus, in
National Gay Task Force v. Board of Education of the City of Oklahoma
City,'I ' for example, the court rejected an establishment clause
challenge to a state statute requiring dismissal of homosexual
teachers. Obviously, these state laws have their origin in tradi-
tional morality, largely arising from the beliefs of conservative
invaded the privacy of family relationships, favored birth control, and taught
a "humanist philosophy." Establishment and free exercise claims were
rejected by the district court. See generally Stewart, The First Amendment, The
Public Schools, and The Inculcation of Community Values, 18J.L. & EDUC. 23, 79-83
(1989).
98. 753 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985).
99. Id. at 1534. See also Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 827 F.2d
684, 693 (11th Cir. 1987) (the mere omission of certain historical facts
regarding theistic religion or the absence of a more thorough discussion of
the manner in which Christianity shaped modern American society did not
convey a message of approval of the religion of secular humanism); Williams
v. Board of Educ., 388 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.W.V.) (denying an establishment
clause claim regarding the use of books with alleged religious and anti-
religious material), aff'd, 530 F.2d 972 (4th Cir. 1975).
100. See also Clergy and Laity Concerned v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 586
F. Supp. 1408 (N.D. 111. 1984) (school practice of allowing military recruiters
access to public schools while denying the same privilege to peace activists
declared unconstitutional). The school argued that allowing access to a
religious peace group would violate the establishment clause. The defense
was rejected by the court because the religious group's message was not
intrinsically religious. See generally Stewart, supra note 97, at 80-89.
101. 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd mem., 470 U.S. 903 (1985).
See also Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash. 2d 286, 559 P.2d
1340 (1977).
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churches, but these religious motivations were held not to
cause such laws to violate church-state separation. 0 2
C. "Religion" From Government's Viewpoint
Another way of looking at the "inherently religious" analy-
sis as part of the Lemon test is to ask: In first amendment analy-
sis, whose perceptions should count as to what is intrinsically
religious, as contrasted with what is moral or essentially non-
religious? The federal courts have struggled with the problem
of defining "religion" so as to achieve the different emphases
of the free exercise and establishment clauses. The courts can-
not adopt a subjective standard to determine what is "inher-
ently religious." America is so religiously diverse that an "eyes
of the beholder" test to determine what is "religion" for estab-
lishment clause purposes would inexorably result in a paralysis
in government. Religious pluralism is so broad that almost
anything government does will likely be seen by someone as
endorsing or repudiating a religious viewpoint.' 0 3
In the first edition of his treatise on constitutional law,
Laurence Tribe suggested two different definitions of "reli-
gion"-a broad and indeterminate definition for free exercise
clause purposes, and a narrow definition for establishment
clause purposes.'" Two definitions were thought to be
required, for otherwise many religious concerns such as racial
equality, social welfare, health care, and criminal laws on vice,
could not simultaneously be supported and advanced by the
churches and government. However, the word "religion"
appears only once in the first amendment and grammatically
should receive the same definition for both religion clauses.' 0 5
102. See generally Stewart, supra note 97, at 57-73 (discussing first
amendment right of teachers to determine content of classroom
presentations).
103. See, e.g., Bollenbach v. Board of Educ., 659 F. Supp. 1450
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (religious objection to female school bus drivers); Moddy v.
Cronin, 484 F. Supp. 270 (C.D. Ill. 1979) (religious objection to mandatory
co-ed gym class where children would wear, and see others wearing, gym
shorts); Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395 (D.N.H. 1974) (religious objection to
use of audio-visual equipment); see generally Grove v. Mead School Dist. No.
354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1537 (9th Cir.) (Canby, J., concurring), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 826 (1985).
104. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 826-31 (1st ed. 1978).
In the second edition of his treatise, Professor Tribe rejects the two-
definition solution and suggests an approach parallel to the analysis here. See
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1185-87 (2d ed. 1988).
105. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 32 (1947) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting):
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This seeming paradox is resolved, not by dual definitions
of "religion," but by recognizing that the free exercise clause
measures "religion" from the religious claimant's viewpoint,
while the establishment clause measures a "law respecting...
religion" from the government's viewpoint. Moreover, it is not
only a difference in "viewpoints," but in what is brought before
the court for "viewing." The danger which the establishment
clause seeks to avoid is not any and all state interaction with
religion and religious organizations. That would lead to a radi-
cally secular state. Rather, the purpose of the clause is to pre-
vent only state involvement with religion that may lead to the
sorts of problems encountered when religion is established.
While the legal definition of "religion" in the first amendment
can remain broad and indeterminate, the necessity of a clear
and fixed structure in church-state relations, equally applicable
to all religions, requires a single legal standard in drawing the
line of separation. That impermissible level of interaction
occurs whenever the state involves itself in the core religious
matters of worship or the propagation or inculcation of the
sorts of beliefs expressed in confessional statements and
creeds. ' 0
6
This difference in how the Court deals with the two reli-
gion clauses is illustrated by comparing Sherbert v. Verner"°7
(holding that choice of a particular day of the week as one's
sabbath is "religion" for free exercise purposes) with McGowan
v. Maryland ' (holding that a state's designation of a particular
day of the week as a day of rest is not a "law respecting ...
"Religion" appears only once in the Amendment. But the word
governs two prohibitions and governs them alike. It does not have
two meanings, one narrow to forbid "an establishment" and
another, much broader, for securing "the free exercise thereof."
"Thereof" brings down "religion" with its entire and exact content,
no more and no less, from the first into the second guaranty ....
106. This understanding of when a law is "an establishment of
religion" is only for purposes for the first amendment. It is not proposed as
an adequate or universal theological definition of religion, only as a definition
that fulfills constitutional purposes. Each faith is still free to define "religion"
for its own purposes in accord with its own understandings. An excellent
discussion on the problem of defining religion for first amendment purposes
appears in Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 200-13 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J.,
concurring in result).
107. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (upholding free exercise clause claim by
Sabbatarian who was denied unemployment compensation because she
refused to accept otherwise suitable job entailing Saturday work).
108. 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (holding that Sunday closing legislation,
albeit historically religious in purpose, is now primarily a labor regulation
that does not violate the establishment clause).
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religion" within the meaning of the establishment clause).
Similarly, in Harris v. McRae '9 a woman's views on the propri-
ety of abortion were treated as "religion" for free exercise pur-
poses,'' 0 but a law forbidding the federal government to
reimburse the cost of abortions under the Medicaid program
was nonetheless not held to be a "law respecting ... religion"
for establishment clause analysis."'
In summary, the measure of a "law respecting ... religion"
from the government's viewpoint is that the law or policy in
question must be "inherently religious," or "clearly religious,"
or not "arguably secular," i.e., "religious" in the conventional
sense of that which is widely regarded as devotional, spiritual,
liturgical, or as involving worship, a confession, a creed, or ven-
eration of a deity. In a related context, Justice O'Connor char-
acterizes this issue as a mixed question of law and fact, "in
large part a legal question to be answered on the basis ofjudi-
cial interpretation of social facts.""' 2 By way of example, Pro-
fessor Tribe contrasts prayer with meditation.' Prayer holds
religious significance for most Americans, yet it may not be offi-
cially endorsed by government, whereas meditation does not
hold religious significance for most people and thus may
(absent a wholly religious purpose) be officially endorsed. "In
the same way," Tribe suggests, "no plausible establishment
clause challenge could be made against the use of the eagle as
an official symbol, despite its religious significance to some
people; but a decisive challenge could be launched against use
of a cross, whose religious significance is clear to nearly all."'14
109. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
110. Id. at 319-21. The free exercise clause claim failed in McRae, not
because a woman's decision to choose to bear a child or obtain an abortion
did not flow from a cognizable religious belief, but because none of the
plaintiffs had standing to argue the claim.
111. Id. at 319-20.
112. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693-94 (1984)). The
"social facts" should be drawn broadly from the relevant governmental
community, and not focus narrowly on a local community. There are difficult
evidentiary problems with a localized "community majority" test of what is
"inherently religious." The difficulty would be evident throughout the trial
of a case, taking the form of hearsay opinion testimony by lay witnesses
concerning the supposed dominant religious beliefs of a local political
community. Moreover, from a conceptual standpoint, it hardly makes sense
to have a chameleon-like establishment clause that applies differently as the
first amendment travels from local community to local community.
113. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1187 (2d ed. 1988).
114. Id. One way in which the Supreme Court avoids judicially probing
legislative motive is by declining to pursue vigorously establishment clause
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D. Inhibiting Free Speech & Political Participation
All citizens should be allowed to participate equally in pub-
lic policy formulation. To exclude those who are informed in
their moral vision by a religious faith would deny them free-
dom of speech and their right to participate in government.
Such a state of affairs would leave the domain of public policy
formulation to none but the nonreligious, and to those who
would conceal the true origins of their moral values. Rather, it
would seem that the first amendment is designed so that all
have space to speak, publicly and with candor.
The Supreme Court has distinguished between laws that
are "inherently religious," on the one hand, and laws that have
their origin in tradition, history, or morals, on the other, partly
out of recognition that citizens have freedom of speech and the
full and equal right to engage in participatory government.' 15
Justice Brennan has provided the clearest statement of the
Supreme Court's attitude in this regard in McDaniel v. Paty:" 6
That public debate of religious ideas, like any other, may
arouse emotion, may incite, may foment religious divi-
siveness and strife does not rob it of constitutional pro-
tection. The mere fact that a purpose of the
Establishment Clause is to reduce or eliminate religious
divisiveness or strife, does not place religious discussion,
association, or political participation in a status less pre-
ferred than rights of discussion, association, and political
participation generally. "Adherents of particular faiths
and individual churches frequently take strong positions
on public issues including ... vigorous advocacy of legal
or constitutional positions. Of course, churches as much
as secular bodies and private citizens have that right."
The State's goal of preventing sectarian bickering
and strife may not be accomplished by regulating reli-
gious speech and political association. The Establish-
ment Clause does not license government to treat
religion and those who teach or practice it, simply by vir-
analysis where the subject matter of the law or rule in question is not
"inherently religious." This directly ties in to the reluctance of the Court to
attribute unconstitutional motives to the relevant legislative body, as
reflected in the Court's deferential application of the purpose prong of the
Lemon test. See supra text accompanying notes 16-20.
115. See L. TRIBE, supra note 113, at 1275-84.
116. 435 U.S. 618, 629 (1977) (plurality opinion) (Brennan, J.
concurring in the judgment). AcDaniel involved a Baptist minister's
successful challenge to a Tennessee law preventing "Ministers of the Gospel,
or priests" from serving in an elected public office.
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tue of their status as such, as subversive of American
ideas and therefore subject to unique disabilities....
In short, government may not as a goal promote
"safe thinking" with respect to religion and fence out
from political participation those, such as ministers,
whom it regards as overinvolved in religion. Religionists
no less than members of any other group enjoy the full
measure of protection afforded speech, association, and
political activity generally. The Establishment Clause,
properly understood, is a shield against any attempt by
government to inhibit religion as it has done here. It may
not be used as a sword to justify repression of religion or
its adherents from any aspect of public life." 7
It appears that the manner in which the Supreme Court
has sought to avoid inhibiting freedom of speech and political
participation is to apply greater or lesser rigor in the purpose
and effect prongs of Lemon, depending on whether the law in
question is or is not "inherently religious." Without such an
approach, the moral views of religio-political majorities would
be restrained from being codified into law. Such a result would
be anti-democratic because it would work a dejure discrimina-
tion adverse to the traditional moral views of the majority in
the relevant political community.
III.
It is hard to think of a contemporary legal doctrine that is
as besieged from all quarters as is the Lemon test. Some of this
criticism, I suggest, is targeted on the literal Lemon test as stated
in 1971, not the evolved Lemon test as the Supreme Court
applies it at present. Moreover, some have taken aim at the
literal test because it makes for an easier target, not because the
critic is unaware that Lemon has evolved.
Still other criticism is due to the commentator's agenda
(sometimes hidden, but often not), and Lemon is in the way of
achieving that agenda. Elsewhere, I have argued that the cho-
rus of complaints against establishment clause cases is due in
considerable measure to the fact that any juridical settlement
concerning church-state relations necessarily implicates theo-
logical positions.' 18 That is to say, the Lemon test, however
applied, is bound to contradict the deeply held religious beliefs
of some, while affirming, or at least coinciding with, the reli-
117. Id. at 640-41 (footnotes and citations omitted).
118. See Esbeck, Five Views of Church-State Relations in Contemporary
American Thought, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 371, 374.
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gious beliefs of others. Thus, when the late John Courtney
Murray insisted that the first amendment's religion clauses
incorporated no "articles of faith," but represented only "arti-
cles of peace,"' 19 he was, ipso facto, making a statement with
theological implications about establishment clause
jurisprudence.
Critics of the Lemon test both in its original and in its
evolved forms, have proposed alternative principles to sup-
plant it. Coercion of conscience, equal protection, nonprefer-
entialism, neutrality, and accommodation are frequently
suggested as guides. Reducing the establishment clause to the
prevention of coercion of religiously based conscience renders
the clause's reach coextensive with that of the free exercise
clause.120 Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that coercion
is not present when general tax revenues are used to advance
the very core activities of religion. 12 1 That result is unaccept-
able to nearly everyone. An equal protection approach that pro-
hibits discrimination among religions, and as between religion
and non-religion, is part of what nonestablishment is about,' 22
but does not adequately cover many other possibilities. Non-
preferentialism was rejected by the Supreme Court way back in
Everson,123 and that holding has been expressly reaffirmed in
McCollum, 12 4 Schempp, 125 and so on down through the years.
While Chief Justice Rehnquist may be persuaded that the first
Congress did not intend to bar nonpreferential support for
religion, 126 nonpreferentialism is insensitive to the long-term
119. J.C. MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS
ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 56 (1964).
120. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248-49 (1968) (no free
exercise violation in absence of claim that statute in question coerced them as
individuals in the practice of their religion); Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) ("a violation of the Free Exercise Clause
is predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause violation need not
be so attended"); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) ("The
Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend
upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the
enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws
operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not.").
121. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971) (no free exercise
claim because plaintiffs were unable to identify any coercion); Board of Educ.
v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248-49 (1968) (same).
122. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
123. 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
124. 333 U.S. 203, 211 (1948).
125. 374 U.S. 203, 216-17 (1963).
126. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
THE LEMON TEST
harmful effects' 2 7 that direct government support would inevi-
tably have on the religious "beneficiaries."
Justice O'Connor's "no-endorsement" test, 128 along with
its "symbolic link" derivative,' 2 9 has been convincingly dis-
credited by Professor Steven D. Smith.' 3 ° Her description of
the "reasonable" or "objective observer" who is to apply the
test sounds autobiographical. It is really just a variant on the
neutrality ideal. The aspirational goal of governmental neutrality
has no substantive content of its own, thus requiring reference
to some other controlling principle to establish a baseline for
comparing proposed state action against the possibility of inac-
tion.13 ' Except as to parochial aid, heretofore the Court has
required empirical or other palpable evidence before finding
the effect prong of Lemon violated. What O'Connor's no-
endorsement test does (at least as to religious symbols) is to
permit this "objective observer" to play the role of expert
social scientist measuring by "eyeball" the normative commu-
nity reaction to the public display of a symbol and announce
whether it endorses or disapproves of religion.
Like Justice Brennan's "abc" test,'3 2 advocated when he
was still relatively new to the church-state debate, Justice
O'Connor's "no-endorsement" approach has not been
127. See Esbeck, Religion and A Neutral State: Imperative or Impossibility?
15 CUMB. L. REV. 67, 81-85 (1984-85) (The harmful effects are these: We
presuppose genuine religion springs from persuasion rather than being a by-
product of privilege; the state has no competence in matters of faith, and to
imply that it does uncritically exalts the state; religion becomes captive of
culture, soon reduced to civil religion; and the agencies of the church risk
being subverted to ends chosen by the state).
128. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 68-79 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-89 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
129. Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985).
Compare with Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2576 (1988) (rejecting a
"symbolic link" argument on given facts).
130. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment
Neutrality and the "iNo Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266 (1987).
131. See D. FELLMAN, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LAw 108-10
(1965).
132. Abington Township School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 231
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring):
[Tlhe Constitution enjoins those involvements of religious with
secular institutions which (a) serve the essentially religious activities
of religious institutions; (b) employ the organs of government for
essentially religious purposes; or (c) use essentially religious means
to serve governmental ends where secular means would suffice.
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(same).
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adopted in toto by other members of the Court-although there
have been flirtations with "endorsement" language in a sup-
porting role or as "make weight" for results reached under
other principles.' Like Justice Brennan's "abc" test, Justice
O'Connor's enthusiasm for her "no-endorsement" approach
will hopefully abate and it can be forgotten.
Finally, there is accommodationism. In discussing church
state relations, the label "accommodationism" is often used as
shorthand for the most plausible alternative to those holding a
'separationist' theory. The term "accommodationist" is dis-
arming of potential critics, for it feigns benign intent by sug-
gesting that all that is asked for is a little breathing space from
an affirmative, smothering state. However, what little doctrinal
clarity there is in this area would be better served if use of the
word "accommodation" was abandoned.
133. Smith, supra note 130, at 275 (1987). Compare with Bowen v.
Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2572-73 (1988) (rejecting an "endorsement"
argument on given facts). But see County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct.
3086 (1989), holding that a Christmas nativity scene displayed on the
staircase of a county courthouse violated the establishment clause, whereas a
Hanukkah menorah displayed alongside a Christmas tree and sign saluting
liberty outside a city-county building did not violate the establishment clause.
The Court did not reject the three-part Lemon test. Rather, five of the Justices
(Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens and O'Connor) applied the
endorsement test as one that "refined" Lemon's effect prong insofar as it
disallows governmental action that advances religion. Id. at 3098-3101 (Part
III-A of Justice Blackmun's opinion). The Court said that it need not
consider at this time whether the endorsement test also modified or
"refined" the purpose and entanglement prongs of the Lemon inquiry. Id. at
3101 n.45. In proceeding to apply this accretion to the effect analysis, the
same five Justices were in agreement that the county's creche display failed
the test. Id. at 3103-05 (Part IV of Justice Blackmun's opinion). However,
when it came to the Hanukkah menorah display, only two of these five
Justices reached the conclusion that the endorsement test was not violated;
indeed, even these two Justices did not agree on the same formulation of the
endorsement test inquiry. Id. at 311-15 (Part VI of Justice Blackmun's
opinion); Id. at 3122-24 (Part III of Justice O'Connor's opinion). Thus, it
took the vote of the four dissenting Justices to reach the result that the
menorah display was constitutional. Id. at 3134-46 (Kennedy, J., dissenting,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White and Scalia,J.J.). Moreover, while finding the
Christmas nativity display violative of the endorsement test, the five-judge
majority did not overrule the result in Lynch v. Donnelly which upheld a
Christmas creche displayed in a different context. It appears self-evident that
the Supreme Court's helter skelter result and inability to apply the
endorsement test in any consistent manner, demonstrates its disutility. By
eschewing broad principles of law, and by using in their placed the
endorsement test and its attendant myth of an "objective observer," the
Court becomes ensnared in micro-managing the numerous occurrences of
governmental acknowledgement of religion.
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First, reliance upon a doctrinal test that hinges on the
word "accommodation" is almost useless in legal argument.
The word is too malleable to be of utility in making the difficult
distinctions required in establishment clause cases. Although
subject to varying interpretations and always vulnerable to dis-
tortion, at least words like "strict separationism," "institutional
separationism," "nonpreferentialism," "equal protection,"
"equal access," and "coercion of conscience" carry some con-
tent that suggest a beginning point in one's legal analysis. The
same cannot be said for the word "accommodation." If use of
the term "accommodation" could be confined to that narrow
range of instances when government enacts an exemption from
general regulation or taxation for religious activity, (although
no exemption is required by the free exercise clause)," 4 then
the term would mean nothing more than the legal conclusion
that the exemption-while not a duty imposed by the free exer-
cise clause-does not violate a duty imposed by the establish-
ment clause. However, it is not clear that there are many such
cases. For reasons of religious liberty, we should uphold the
view that the exemptions of Walz, Catholic Bishop, and Amos," 5
for example, are required by the first amendment. Still, if
"accommodation" were used in this limited sense, there would
not be a major problem. But the term cuts a far broader swath.
Second, if taken literally, the word "accommodation"
would be detrimental to religious rights. Just as the term "tol-
eration" suggests that government is patronizing minority reli-
gions by choosing to afford them religious freedom, the term
"accommodation" suggests that government has graciously
elected to grant religious freedom in a given situation. In
speaking of the first amendment, it promotes clarity to think in
terms of individual and communal rights to religious liberty,
and the state's duties and authority.
Third, depending upon the author and the audience, the
term "accommodation" is used so indiscriminately that at one
time or another all but the strictest of separationists fall within
134. See Adams & Gordon, The Doctrine of Accommodation in The
Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses, 37 DE PAUL L. REV. 317 (1988).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 48-52. But see Texas Monthly,
Inc. v. Bullock, 109 S. Ct. 890 (1989) (plurality opinion). Texas Monthly strikes
down a state sales and use tax exemption that applied only to religious
literature sold by religious organizations. Although there was no majority
opinion, five Justices held that the narrow exemption violated the
establishment clause. However, these same Justices all indicated that an
exemption that benefited a broader class of nonprofit organizations would be
constitutionally permissible.
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its sweep. The use of "accommodation" in this highly obscur-
antist way can cause those who do not identify with strict-
separationism to fail to distinguish themselves from those
advancing some other agenda under the banner of accom-
modationism. This gives the perception that accommodation-
ism has more supporters than is the case.
Fourth, if what accommodationists want is nonpreferential
government support of religion, then why not call it that? In
fairness, some do. As to the rest, the reason may be that
accommodationists fear rejection from a public not yet pre-
pared to accept nonpreferentialism. To adopt nonpreferential-
ism would work a sea of change in current legal doctrine. This
would be true even if nonpreferentialism was redefined as
requiring the state to be more inclusive, thus requiring all simi-
larly situated organizations, both secular and religious, to be
equally assisted by government funding.
As to all of these suggested controlling principles-offered
as would-be usurpers of the Lemon test as it has evolved-the
law's inherent reluctance to embrace something new is cap-
tured in the maxim, Better to live with the devil we do know, than the
devil we don't.
